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Malgré des succès tout à fait significatifs remportés par les politiques environ-
nementales depuis un demi-siècle, force est de constater que ces dernières ne
suffisent pas en l'état actuel, à garantir un usage véritablement durable des
ressources naturelles. Tout semble en effet se passer comme si ces différentes
politiques publiques de protection de l'environnement - fondées essentielle-
ment sur des objectifs et des instruments de limitation des émissions nocives
pour le "voisinage" - avaient trouvé aujourd'hui leurs limites.
Fort de ce constat, fondé sur des analyses empiriques approfondies de proces-
sus d'exploitation de ressources, ainsi que sur une analyse systématique des
règles régissant leurs usages et les droits des usagers, ce cahier propose une nou-
velle lecture du monde empirique à l'aide du concept de "régime institutionnel
de ressources naturelles" (RIRN). Adoptant une approche véritablement
ressourcielle et combinant les apports analytiques de l'analyse des politiques
publiques avec la théorie des droits de propriété développée par l'économie
institutionnelle des ressources, le concept de régime institutionnel fournit des
instruments d'analyse plus appropriés pour comprendre les enjeux de régula-
tions des ressources naturelles dans les pays industrialisés et partant, permet d'i-
dentifier les principaux obstacles actuels à une gestion durable de ces ressources.
Ce faisant, il permet également de formuler quelques principes normatifs et de
recommandations quant à la manière de concevoir des dispositifs de régulations
susceptibles de garantir une gestion durable des ressources naturelles dans nos
sociétés. Finalement, les auteurs présentent en conclusion quelques pistes con-
cernant l'application du concept de régime institutionnel à d'autres types de
ressources matérielles, artificielles, culturelles ou encore symboliques.
Despite considerable successes that have emerged from environmental policies
over the last half-century of atmospheric pollution, the latter are not sufficient
in their current state to guarantee a truly sustainable use of natural resources. In
fact, it appears as though these various environmental protection policies - basi-
cally on objectives and instruments designed to limit noxious emissions in
neighbouring areas - have now found their limits.
Based on in-depth empirical analyses of resource exploitation processes and a
systematic analysis of the rules that govern resource uses and the rights of
resource users, this contribution presents a new interpretation of the empirical
world by employing the concept of "institutional natural resource regimes"
(INRR). This resource-based approach combines the analytical strengths of
public policy analysis with the theories of property rights of institutional
resource economics, and thus it is an appropriate analytical framework for
understanding the issues of natural resource use regulations in industrial coun-
tries and identifying the obstacles that hinder sustainable resource management.
Furthermore, it is a framework from which to formulate normative concepts
and recommendations regarding the way in which to design the regulations
most likely to guarantee a sustainable management of natural resources. Finally,
the authors present some thoughts concerning the application of the concept
of institutional regimes to other types of material, intangible, cultural, and sym-
bolic resources.
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Introduction1 
There are few terms that are used in such an inflated manner as the 
word "sustainability". Politicians, businesspeople, scientists and all 
kinds of advertisers consider themselves, their proposals, their articles 
and their beliefs to be more sustainable than the ones of their competi-
tors. Listening to them, one gets the impression that our world is the 
most sustainable one imaginable. Looking at reality, the exact opposite 
is true. Globalization accelerates all kinds of industrial, domestic and 
urban metabolisms and increasingly unbundled market mechanisms are 
becoming a serious threat for the survival of the reproductive capacities 
of our common natural resources. With the advancement of globaliza-
tion and market liberalization, the need for solid institutional mecha-
nisms capable of guaranteeing the survival of normally local and/or 
regional natural resources has tremendously increased in the last twenty 
years. Traditional environmental protection policies are incapable of 
doing this job. Like many other scholars and politicians, we believe that 
fundamental changes in the way we manage our common natural re-
sources are inevitable if we claim to fight against the "plundering of our 
common wealth" [Bollier 2002]. 
This article is meant to be a modest contribution to the theoretical and 
empirical thoughts towards a solution of this vital problem of overex-
ploitation of natural resources. It firstly explores the traditional re-
sponse to this question which consists of a wide range of environmental 
policies, each of which has the objective of providing a solution to the 
collective problem of protecting the resource against pollution. Taking 
into account the current situation, which shows increasingly clear indi-
cations of a lack of sustainability in the exploitation of these resources, 
we then undertake to demonstrate that these traditional processes use 
                                                          
1 We acknowledge Lee Nicol for rereading the final version of this text. The original 
French version can be found in Knoepfel and Nahrath [2005 : 199-255]. We are grate-
ful to the the publisher of the original version (Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires 
Romandes in Lausanne, Switzerland) for authorizing the publication of this translation. 
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highly diverse policies – essentially based on the objectives and instru-
ments of emissions restrictions – and have reached their limits (section 
1). With the help of more detailed observations of empirical processes 
involving the exploitation of natural resources and of the rules that 
currently regulate their uses and the rights of users (section 2), we pre-
sent a new reading of the empirical world based on the concept of 
institutional natural resource regimes (INRR), a concept that takes into 
account the property, disposal and use rights of actors who use these 
resources along with the policies that govern them (section 3). In our 
view, the analytical capacity of this new concept is superior to that of 
both policy analysis and institutional resource economics. This belief is 
backed by a number of empirical research projects carried out by our 
team since 1998.2 This chapter presents the INRR concept and its 
main theoretical bases while also adding some relatively new dimen-
sions to the issues surrounding its empirical and practical application 
(section 4) which have not yet been published elsewhere.3 The conclud-
ing section (section 5) presents some suggestions concerning the appli-
cation of the INRR concept to other types of resources besides natural 
ones. 
                                                          
2 This group, which met frequently in the course of numerous working sessions, includes, 
in addition to the two authors, David Aubin, Kurt Bisang, Jean-David Gerber, Ingrid 
Kissling-Näf, Corine Mauch, Emmanuel Reynard, Raimund Rodewald, Jérôme Savary, 
Adèle Thorens and Frédéric Varone. The research carried out by the group was fi-
nanced through three FNS (Swiss National Science Foundation) projects (Division I 
and Division IV) and by the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science. The fol-
lowing researchers also participated in the development of this analytical framework in 
the context of the European “Euwareness” project (EVK1CT-99-0038): Hans Bressers 
and Stefan Kuks, Corinne Larrue, Bruno Dente, Joan Subirats, Frédéric Varone and 
their colleagues. Numerous students from the IDHEAP and the Postgraduate Diploma 
(DESS) in Urban Studies of the University of Lausanne also contributed by means of 
studies (seminar papers and diploma theses) involving the application of this concept. 
3 Other presentations of the analytical framework of INRR can be found in Kissling-Naef 
and Varone [2000a], [2000b]; Knoepfel, Kissling-Naef and Varone [2001:11-48], 
[2003: 1-58]; Nahrath [2003a: 5-55]. 
  
3 
1 The Management of Natural Re-
sources on the Basis of Traditional 
Environmental Policies 
Anyone proposing to manage natural resources in a way that is com-
patible with the environment, or to use the language adopted in the 
aftermath of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 "sustainably", will refer to 
the enormous body of environmental protection legislation that exists 
in Switzerland, in all European countries and on the level of the Euro-
pean Union. The aim of this legislation is to protect human beings, 
plants and their bicenonsis against hazardous or noxious substances by 
reducing them to a level that can be considered tolerable. These policies 
are conceived as a means of fighting immissions4 (i.e. environmental 
impacts) through the imposition of reductions in emissions. While it 
cannot be denied that such policies have produced results, in particular 
with respect to the protection of water bodies, the protection of the air 
and the treatment of waste [Varone 2004], they have been clearly less 
successful in the area of the (qualitative and quantitative) protection of 
soils, nature and landscape [OCDE 1998; ARE 2005]. Moreover, in 
Switzerland we are now seeing the re-emergence of problems in areas 
that had shown positive developments over the last three decades of the 
20th century. These include, in particular, new increases in atmos-
pheric pollution, the repeated failure to respect residual flows in certain 
watercourses, the increase of urban waste produced, not to mention the 
rises in CO2 production and energy consumption [OFEN 2005]. Even 
more worryingly, there are few indications that these policies have 
made any effective contribution to increasing the sustainability of our 
use of renewable and non-renewable natural resources. On the con-
trary, the current debates on the (un)sustainability of their use show 
clear signs of a very limited contribution of these policies to the 
                                                          
4 Immissionsschutzpolitiken in German. 
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achievement of truly sustainable development, particularly in urban 
areas [OFS, OFEFP, ARE 2003].  
As a result of these phenomena, observers now have an obligation to 
review in detail the conception of these environmental policies whose 
purpose is to protect natural resources. Based on the analysis of these 
policies, it is relatively easy to demonstrate that one of their main weak-
nesses is that these policies originate in – and again are often partly 
based on – rights of adjoining owners (droit de voisinage) [Knoepfel 
2000b]. Thus their essential objective is to protect the environment and 
natural resources only from the effects of "immissions" or impacts 
originating from the emission of pollutants. It does not address the 
effects triggered by other forms of exploitation such as water withdrawal, 
clear cutting, or construction. According to this conception, it only 
becomes necessary to protect resources when the processes of extrac-
tion, exploitation and processing of natural resources give rise to emis-
sions that are likely to affect the resources in question or other re-
sources. Thus, any exploitation of (primary or recycled) natural re-
sources that does not produce emissions that cause harm or discomfort 
to human beings or other resources will not be governed by environ-
mental policy. Therefore, there is a risk that the successful implementa-
tion of an environmental policy that aims to fight immissions will pave 
the way for the "legitimate over-exploitation" of natural resources based 
on the principle of "the lower the emissions, the greater the admissible 
level of exploitation"5. When considered from the perspective of the 
management of natural resources, the real paradox of traditional envi-
ronmental policies is encapsulated in this statement. In effect, very few 
environmental policies exist today that explicitly forgo this requirement 
that emissions be present. Indeed, this requirement does not exist in the 
case of policies for the conservation and protection of nature and the 
protection of landscape [Knoepfel 2000b: 199] which, according to the 
available data, are both among the least effective environmental policies 
– particularly because they encounter difficulties in making threats 
                                                          
5 For example, improving water quality allows greater water withdrawal. 
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visible [Larrue and Knoepfel 1998: 192 ff.] and attributable to effec-
tively "hazardous" activities which lends them a legitimacy in the eyes 
of those who are accustomed to fighting hazards affecting health or 
ecosystems. Furthermore, the landscape and biomass have very few 
clearly identifiable owners who are likely to institute proceedings in 
favour of their protection based on the "vigilant neighbour" model.6  
These policies are characterized by yet another weakness. Since the 
1980s, environmental policy analysts have highlighted the need to take 
into consideration the spatial and environmental repercussions of poli-
cies that have an influence – voluntary or involuntary – on the behav-
iour of potential producers of emissions. They emphasize the fact that 
many non-environmental policies exist that contribute directly or indi-
rectly to the generation of considerable burdens on the environment. 
Urban development (soil), transport (air and urban surfaces), agricul-
ture (water, air and soil), economic promotion (all areas combined) and 
energy (water, landscape, air) were also analyzed in terms of their spatial 
and environmental impacts. These analyses clearly show the power and 
increasing dynamics of these exploitation policies which are capable of 
challenging the limited successes of environmental protection policies 
[Benninghoff et al. 2004: 697 ff.].  
The limits of  traditional environmental policies can also be explained 
by the fact that they generally only concern a single use of a resource, 
i.e. the absorption, dilution, decomposition or transport of noxious 
emissions. However, as we know from resource economics, all resources 
are likely to be subject to a large number of different, and often simul-
taneous, uses ("goods and services") that potentially compete with the 
use of the resource for the absorption of pollutants, which is normally 
regulated by traditional environmental protection policies [Knoepfel 
                                                          
6 The absence in many cases of a “neighbour” likely to intervene in the event of damage 
caused to their property was historically one of the main arguments in favour of the 
introduction of the right of appeal by environmental protection and nature conserva-
tion organizations into the Swiss Federal Law on the Protection of Nature and the 
Landscape (Loi fédérale sur la protection de la nature et du paysage) of 1 July 1966 (art. 
12), RS 451. 
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and Savary 2002]. Thus, it is possible to treat wastewater using turbines 
and use the same water to store thermal energy. Similarly, polluted and 
non-potable water can be used for agricultural irrigation (as long as the 
pollutants it contains are not toxic) and polluted air can even be used as 
a medium for aeronautical activities. It is interesting and important to 
confirm the existence of a clear causal link between the progressive 
recognition of the utility and, hence, the status of the goods and/or 
services among the different services provided by a natural resource, on 
the one hand, and the creation of very varied policies whose precise 
objective is the regulation of (homogeneous or heterogeneous) rivalries 
between the different uses and/or groups of users, on the other. How-
ever, in most cases, these policies concern a specific use, which is gener-
ally considered from the perspective of the regulation of activities7 and 
the relations between actors-users rather than from the perspective of 
the resource itself. Moreover, this is the reason why these policies are 
still rarely coordinated today and why they are often managed by spe-
cialized administrative bodies. These administrative bodies seldom have 
regular contact with each other, which would enable truly coordinated 
management of natural resources and the various, already regulated 
goods and services produced by them [Knoepfel 1995]. 
As we shall show in the next section, this resource-economics-based 
approach has gained significant relevance since the birth of the concept 
of sustainable use of natural resources. This concept highlights the 
homogenous, integrated, and interdependent character of both a re-
source system and the goods and services derived from it, even though 
the latter are regulated by numerous specific policies. Thus, there is no 
reason to consider, for example, the urban resources located within the 
territory of a town or city and those located outside of urban centres 
                                                          
7 These activities are normally regulated in accordance with a sectoral use logic based on 
economic promotion within agricultural, fishing, forestry, energy, transport, industrial 
promotion, tourism and urbanism policies which will be studied as part of a European 
project proposed in April 2005 within the Priority Programme 7 “Citizens and govern-
ance in a knowledge based society” under the title “Suitable regimes for sustainable 
resource management – SR2” (coordinator: Peter Knoepfel, IDHEAP) (project unfor-
tunately not financed). 
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separately as, in reality, they often belong to the same resource system. 
Similarly, it no longer makes sense to consider and, hence, regulate the 
uses of each of the goods and services provided by a single resource 
separately. In fact, the regulation of one of these goods and services may 
undermine the regulation of all of the other goods and services during 
periods when the resource in question is subject to over-exploitation. 
The artificial division resulting from the current organization and struc-
turing of policies between resources exploited for production within 
multiple industrial or urban metabolisms, on the one hand, and re-
sources used on the basis of their absorption capacity, on the other, is 
hardly compatible with the objective of their sustainable management, 
the principles of intergenerational and interregional solidarity, and the 
integration of the global in the local [Di Giulio 2004: 151 ff.; OFS, 
OFEFP, ARE 2003: 12 ff.]. Thus, the perspectives of all of the users of 
all of the goods and services of a single resource must be taken into 
account. Such an "actantial" approach [Berthelot 1990: 76; Scharpf 
1997] should include all of the rules (= institutions) that influence the 
users of a single resource and, hence, their behaviour. This group is 
almost always significantly larger than that of the producers of emis-
sions who constitute the target group of traditional environmental 
policies 
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2 The Genesis and Development of 
the Political and Institutional 
Regulation for the Use of Natural 
Resources 
2.1 Basic concepts 
Taking the above into account, the management of natural resources 
should concern itself with renewable natural resources since non-
renewable resources are basically – and in some cases probably incor-
rectly – considered easier to substitute with the help of technological 
processes and innovations [O’Connor 2002; Devlin and Grafton 1998; 
Bromley 1991]. Ensuring the sustainable existence of a renewable re-
source constitutes the best guarantee that it will be possible to obtain 
the goods and services derived from it now and, above all, in the future. 
It is not possible to continue exploiting a natural resource whose stock 
has reached a point whereby the quantity of "units" or "flows" available 
for extraction or withdrawal is heading to zero due to over-exploitation 
in the past. 
The sustainable management of these resources must incorporate both 
the boundaries of the resources and all of the goods and services derived 
from them. This last and, at an initial glance, innocuous statement has 
fundamental implications for the way in which the sustainable man-
agement of local/regional resources is conceived. Basically, it is possible 
to identify – very schematically – three levels of conception of the sus-
tainable management of local/regional resources which vary according 
to the extent of their requirements (Figure 1): i.e. the "traditional" 
conception of environmental policy (conception 1); the conception 
expressed in the political discourse of sustainable development (concep-
tion 2); and the scientific conception of sustainability, which is based 
on a truly resource-based approach (conception 3). 
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Figure 1  
The different levels of conception of sustainabiliy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The "traditional" conception (1) of environmental policies is undoubtedly 
the least sustainable of the three to the extent that its rationale is lim-
ited to the restriction of pollutant emissions, i.e. in many cases the restric-
tions are still applied without consideration of the actual absorption 
capacity of the resource. This is best illustrated by the often almost 
uncompelling and, in certain cases even, non-existent relationship 
between the definition of emission standards and environmental quality 
standards. 
Conception (2) conveyed via the discourse and, when present, implementa-
tion of sustainable development policies consists for the most part in the 
practice in a tentative to coordinate environmental requirements 
Economy Social
Conception 3: Sustainable development and 
institutional natural resource regimes
Conception 2: 
Sustainability policies
Conception 1: 
Environmental policies
Environment
Good A 
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(which are still essentially based on the restriction of emissions) with 
the social and economic requirements or interests affected by these 
restrictions. The ecological requirement of the famous sustainability 
triangle incorporates all of the legal norms defined in the traditional 
environmental legislation, which are often very detailed and contain 
quantifiable indicators. However, unlike traditional policies, this eco-
logical requirement targets not only the producers of sources of envi-
ronmental nuisance for an area, but also those who produce emissions 
that are harmful to the resources in their possession. What is clearly 
involved here is the reinforcement of the protective potential of these 
traditional environmental policies, despite the fact that it remains 
within the scope of a relatively weak conception of sustainability.8 
In fact, the empirical processes relating to "sustainable development" 
basically focus their attention on the modes of uses of goods and services 
provided by natural resources, i.e. the regulation of these uses are sup-
posed to guarantee the ecologically, economically and socially sustain-
able and equitable exploitation of resources [Di Giulio 2004: 49 ff.; 
Conseil fédéral 2002: 9ff.; United Nations 2002; World Commission 
1987]. However, this focus takes for granted that it is possible to obtain 
a sufficient quantity of resource units in the form of goods and services, 
yet this is far from evident. In reality, there is nothing to prevent the 
extraction or use of a resource in a way that is "ecological" in the sense 
of traditional environmental policies (i.e. one that is not a source of 
environmental nuisance to human beings, animals and plants and their 
biocenosis) but that is ultimately unsustainable since it could lead to 
the over-exploitation of the resource which is likely to impair its capac-
ity to regenerate. Thus, as previously mentioned, parts of sustainability 
policies do not actually prevent the over-exploitation of a resource in 
the "strict ecological sense".  
                                                          
8 According to the authorities responsible for this issue [OFS, OFEFP, ARE 2003: 14 ff.] 
the Swiss federal government’s strategy starts from a position of socalled “weak sustain-
ability” [Knoepfel, Münster 2004: 80 ff.]. The latter “sanctions capital compensation 
but only if the use of capital is not irreversible and does not represent a threat to the 
survival of humanity, an area normally governed by limit values” [ibid : 80]. 
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The second postulate of sustainable development, i.e. that of economic 
sustainability, encompasses the economic use of the resource both on 
the micro-economic level of the actor using the resource (e.g. by com-
panies) and on the macroeconomic level of the economic system in its 
entirety. Economic sustainability generally refers to the viability of the 
production system and companies or the maintenance of their capacity 
to produce goods and services while producing additional value in a 
general context characterized by the increasing scarcity of resources and, 
equally, increasing marginal costs. Based on the example of industrial 
ecology [Erkman 1998], this postulate materializes in particular 
through legislation (current and planned) involving obligations to 
recycle or reduce the quantity of waste and emissions produced from 
reusable materials or to prioritize the allocation of raw materials during 
periods of scarcity. While traditional environmental protection re-
quirements are relatively clear today since they are based inter alia on 
scientific experience, economic sustainability is more politically and 
scientifically controversial. Even outside of the eternal debate of 
planned economy versus market economy,9 now less virulent than it 
was in the 1960s, the question of the allocative optimization of produc-
tion factors within what is considered generally a market economy 
remains controversial. This is why state allocation mechanisms based 
on authorizations, licenses and quotas have been maintained for certain 
goods and services whereas the allocation mechanisms set by the market 
constitute the rule for others. Mixed systems can also be observed that 
combine a state-imposed global quota on the extraction/withdrawal of 
resources (in particular for goods and services considered at risk due to 
the over-exploitation of the resource) and the distribution of these 
quotas among individual users on the basis of market mechanisms or, 
in some cases, their allocation by authorities [Kirchgässner 2002; 
                                                          
9 According to the representatives of the neo-Marxist movement of the 1960s, only 
collective, state or community planning would be effectively capable of combating the 
abusive exploitation of our natural resources and manufactured resources, referred to 
using the generic term of “factors of production”. This postulate would affect land/soil 
in particular and would lead to various propositions of its nationalization. 
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Varone 2002]. The fact remains that the concretization of the principle 
of economic sustainability (and equally of social sustainability) will 
remain significantly more controversial than that of ecological sustain-
ability and this is clearly evident in the difficulty that exists in formulat-
ing concrete postulates and deducing universally accepted indicators for 
it [Knoepfel 2005a]. 
A similar, and probably even greater, problem arises when it comes to 
the concretization of the third postulate, i.e. that of socially sustainable 
development. In reality, the definition of genuine rights of equal access 
to the goods and services derived from natural resources in situ is far 
from being accepted by all actor-users and is the subject of serious 
conflict between the holders and non-holders of such rights [Barnes 
2001; Behan 2001; Bollier 2002; Radin 1996]. The current debate on 
the limits of the welfare state and the past controversies surrounding 
the enshrining of social rights in national constitutions and the Euro-
pean Constitutional Charter bear witness to this. The absence of real 
legal norms and clearly quantifiable indicators concerning the mini-
mum rights of access to the different vital goods and services supplied 
by natural resources is a clear sign of the highly political issues con-
cealed behind the notion of socially sustainable development. 
Finally, as suggested by the distinction between the three sustainability 
conception levels represented in Figure 1, the sustainability policies 
emerging over the past twelve years or so undoubtedly constitute an 
important initial step in the direction of sustainability. However, in 
their current state of development, they are not in a position to guaran-
tee the truly sustainable management of (natural) resources, in the 
majority of cases. The situation in which we find ourselves today re-
garding policies for ecological, economic and social sustainability is 
comparable to the paradox of traditional environmental policies re-
ferred to in section 1. In fact, there is a significant risk that the pursuit 
of social, economic and even ecological sustainability at the level of 
selected goods and services will ultimately lead to the non-sustainable 
management of the resource. This is the case when the extraction and 
distribution of the resource’s goods and services are carried out on the 
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basis of the simple logic of pollution limitation or reinternalization of 
negative externalities ("polluter pays" principle), i.e. independently of 
the estimated reproduction capacities of the different resource systems. 
In our view, the sustainability postulate (conception 3) requires the 
clear distinction between the sustainability of the resource (system) and 
the ecological, economic and social sustainability of its different uses. In 
reality, it is only possible to exploit the goods and services of a resource 
sustainably if its reproduction capacity is not put at risk. Such an objec-
tive can only be attained if sustainability policies undergo a fundamen-
tal conversion, which they have hitherto mostly failed to do, from the 
logic of control and restriction of pollutant emissions (management and 
reinternalization of negative externalities) to policies focusing on the 
management of the stocks and reproductive capacities of resource sys-
tems. It should be noted that a shift of this kind comes down to recog-
nizing the primacy of the ecological pole over the economic and social 
poles of the sustainability triangle and in that reminds us of a basic 
principle – at the same time as an obvious fact – of the heuristics of 
sustainable development, a principle too often forgotten in the context 
of the development and implementation of contemporary sustainability 
policies: in other words the ecological sustainability of different re-
source systems constitutes an indispensable (but far from sufficient) 
condition for the existence of the sustainability of social, economic and 
ecological uses of the goods and services provided by resources. The 
latter can only be guaranteed if all of the users jointly ensure that the 
quantities they extract or withdraw from a resource do not reach the 
limit of the reproductive capacity of the resource system, a requirement 
that should in principle give rise to inconveniences for all users (the 
symmetry of sacrifices made being one of the conditions of social sus-
tainability). Given that all natural resources today are at least in part the 
product of human activities, this objective often is only attainable un-
der the condition that the appropriators and users limit the quantities 
of goods and services they extract or even contribute actively to the 
The Genesis and Development of the Political and Institutional Regulation 
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conservation of the resource through investments coming from human, 
manufactured or cultural capital.10 
Figure 2 reminds us, that each resource produces different goods and/or 
services that change in time and space according to the requirements of 
its users. The quantities of resources available for withdrawal or extrac-
tion (to satisfy the needs of users in terms of goods and services) de-
pends on the size of the stocks and the (variable) reproductive capacity 
of the resource systems ("fruits"). 
Figure 2  
Goods and services (G&S) of a natural renewable resource 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Knoepfel et al. [2001 : 18]; Kissling-Näf and Varone [2000: 
238]. 
 
As stated in the introduction, the withdrawal or extraction of these 
goods and services may lead to situations of exclusion and rivalry or, 
conversely, to simultaneous complementary and non-rival uses. It is 
                                                          
10 According to the terminology of the World Bank [World Bank 1995]. Cf. Knoepfel 
[2005b]. 
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possible to record for each natural resource analyzed a list – whose 
length will depend on the resource and the state of (economic, cultural 
etc.) development of a society – of the goods and services extracted 
[Knoepfel et al. 2001: 65 (soil); 2001 : 105 (water); 2001 : 146 (for-
ests); Rodewald et al. 2005: 56 ff. (landscape)]. Based on these lists, the 
researcher can then identify precisely the uses, users and, moreover, the 
rules that legitimize (i.e. authorize) or delegitimize (i.e. prohibit) the 
empirical uses in question. 
Figure 3 presents in schematic form the link between the stock and 
extractions/withdrawals of a natural resource, thus demonstrating the 
mechanisms of over-exploitation or under-exploitation, both of which 
are likely to affect the reproductive capacity of a natural resource. 
Figure 3  
Over and under-exploitation of a resource 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource at time T1
Over-exploitation Y1 > W1
Resource at time T2
Stock = X1
Fruits = W1
Extractions/
withdrawals = Y1
Stock = X2
Fruits = W2
Extractions/
withdrawals = Y2
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Source: Knoepfel et al. [2001: 21]. 
 
2.2 Origins of the need for regulation of the uses 
(G&S) of a resource: the contribution of insti-
tutional resource economics 
It is our belief that in order to implement the principle of sustainable 
development on the two levels outlined in Figure 1, conceptions 2 and 
3, it is not sufficient to formulate individualized and specific regula-
tions for each of the goods and services produced by a resource through 
public policies alone. On the contrary, a glance at the origins of the 
modes of political regulation shows that the public action likely to 
guarantee or re-establish the reproductive capacity of the resource in 
question should also govern all of its units ("fruits") considered extract-
able in a given time or space. This principle should be applied inde-
pendently of the object of extraction (i.e. specific good or service) and 
implemented through a global extraction quota that is acceptable for 
the entire resource. Given that this quota may vary in time and space, 
the public action must regulate the way in which this quota is defined 
and also the way choices are made in the case of rivalries between the 
various goods and services extracted regarding their quality and quan-
Resource at time T1
Under-exploitation Y1 < W1
Resource at time T2
Stock = X1
Fruits = W1
Extractions/
withdrawals = Y1
Stock = X2
Fruits = W2
Extractions/
withdrawals = Y2
Cahier de l'IDHEAP 226 
 18 
tity considered legitimate. Thus, for any regulation considered, three 
successive operations should be implemented, all of which constitute 
fundamental political choices.  
Firstly, a maximum global quota should be defined for the extrac-
tion/withdrawal of resource units that incorporates both quantitative 
and qualitative criteria that are compatible with the ecological require-
ments for the renewal of the resource system. We suspect that the defi-
nition of such a quota would constitute a central political issue to the 
extent that it expresses the conception of sustainability (i.e. strong, 
weak, etc.) adopted by a given society. Secondly, this global quota 
should be shared between the different rival uses (goods and services), 
ideally as a function of the principles of social and economic sustain-
ability. Thirdly, the quota of resource units attributed to a specific good 
or service should again be distributed between the different user groups 
and, if possible, also on the basis of the principles of social and eco-
nomic sustainability. 
It is clear that such regulations tend to emerge where the need for them 
is felt and, historically, prior to the advent of the sustainability debate 
[Ostrom 1990]. All together, they constitute what we refer to as an 
institutional resource regime (IR). Based on the local characteristics of 
these regulations, such regimes may lead to either the destruction of a 
resource or its conservation and/or exploitation in a way that is consid-
ered as sustainable to varying degrees. Thus, these regulations are pri-
marily observable empirical realities that are more or less "adequate" 
from the normative perspective of the postulates of sustainability. They 
incorporate both regulations associated to policies and the rights of 
ownership based on constitutional principles or private law. They 
emerge when a sufficiently powerful actor demonstrates the need for 
them, most frequently as a result of a significant deterioration in the 
state of a resource. 
Theoretically, it is possible to model the emergence of regulation pro-
cedures while differentiating between different stages of resource use, 
moving from a so-called "normal" situation involving the use of goods 
and services (Phase 1a) to a situation of uncontrolled increase in the 
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extraction of certain goods and services likely to exceed the annually 
acceptable limit (Phase 1b, Fig. 4), and ending up with a situation in 
which the reproductive capacity of the resource is called into question 
(Phase 2). In such situations, we see the initial attempts at quantitative 
and qualitative regulation of these extractions (i.e. global quota) and 
this process corresponds to the political "birth" of the resource (Phases 
2 and 3). The restriction on the allowable extraction ultimately involves 
the adaptation of the behaviour of individual actor-users who are forced 
to limit their actual extractions (Phase 4). This process is presented 
schematically in Figure 4. 
Figure 4  
Schematical presentation of the process of exploitation of the  
political regulation of natural resources  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1a: Initial unproblematic exploitation
Extractable units
(« harvest »)
Actors exploiting the resource, increasing in number
Rules ensuring exploitation (« right of use »)
Goods / services used
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Phase 1b: “Unchecked” growth in homogenous and heterogeneous uses
Harvest
Actors exploiting the resource, increasing in number
Rules ensuring exploitation (« right of use »)
Goods / services used
Phase 2: Scarcity and political “birth” of the resource
FruitsHarvest
Stock
Actor users
Goods / services used
Threatened goods/services 
Rules ensuring exploitation (« right of use »)
Rules governing access to exploitation under threat
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Phase 3: Political definition of a maximum harvest (global quota)
FruitsHarves
Stock
Global quota
Phase 4: Redefinition (quantitative and qualitative) of the B&S
FruitsHarves
Stock
X
X
X
X
X
Global quota
Actor users
Goods / services used
Goods / services declared as unexploitable (« condemned »)
Rules ensuring exploitation (« right of use »)
Rules denying access to the exploitation of a « condemned » good / serviceX
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2.3 The basic elements of the institutional regime 
In Phase 2, at the latest, we see the emergence of more or less robust 
and exclusive regulations whose objective is to guarantee actor-users 
stabilized access in time and space to one of the specific goods or ser-
vices that they appropriated or claimed in the preceding phase (Phase 
1b). These regulations provide a precise definition of the good or ser-
vice in question, and – in an initial period independent of truly re-
source-based considerations – the property and use rights to this good or 
service as well as the modes of its attribution to different groups of 
users. The aim of these regulations consists in controlling the behaviour 
of actor-users by means of (stabilizing or modifying) intervention in the 
relationship that previously existed between them and the good or 
service in question. This is achieved through the attribution of univer-
sally recognized use rights. These relationships may be created, quanti-
tatively and qualitatively redefined, eliminated etc. by means of either 
the modification of formal property rights (Civil Code), the modifica-
tion of rights of disposal and use, or the redefinition of the obligations 
attributed to or incumbent upon the actors within specific policies (e.g. 
water withdrawal concession, planning permission etc.). Figure 5 shows 
a schematic presentation of this right of use which allows actors who 
hold it to refuse all other actors, either permanently or temporarily, 
exclusively or selectively, the access to the good or service in question 
and, by doing this, to stabilize and render predictable the modes of 
their own access to the good or service in question [Bromley 1991, 
1992; Devlin and Grafton 1998; Nahrath 2003a: 19 ff.]. 
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Figure 5  
Regulation of individual use rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This need to formulate rights may emerge prior to the arrival of any 
threat to the resource in question and generally results from the need to 
stabilize and render more predictable the relations between an "owner" 
and his or her "property" , in particular for economic reasons. This 
need is found at the origin of Roman Law, in the phenomenon of 
"enclosures" and, again, in the generalization of private or exclusive 
property after the French Revolution [Aubin, Nahrath, Varone 
2004].11 Obviously, this need would become even more evident when 
the threat of over-exploitation of a resource exists. Under such increas-
ingly frequent conditions, the main concern of legislators is not only 
guaranteeing this individual right in the interest of maintaining the 
stability of the conditions necessary for economic activities, but render-
ing it compatible with the need to maintain the resource and its repro-
                                                          
11 Such a need even exists among nomad populations who frequently integrate forms of 
ownership, possession, right of usufruct etc. into their legal order. [Hagmann 2004]. 
Harvest
Stock
Actor users
Good / service used
Rule ensuring exploitation (« right of use) »)
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duction capacity as a common good [Bromley 1991; Devlin and Graf-
ton 1998; Holzinger 2002; Ostrom 2002]. For this reason, in the case 
of a real scarcity of one of the resource’s goods and services which risks 
leading to its over or under-exploitation (excessive or under-use of the 
global quota), the need arises for a second layer of regulation whose aim 
is to alter the behaviour of the actor-user based on the public problem 
of the survival of the resource. Therefore, its objective consists in the 
regulation of the behaviour of actor-users based on a politically defined 
global quota. In fact, this second layer of regulation should dominate 
the first. However, the mere existence of such rights of use is a precon-
dition for any public action that aims to regulate all of these uses: it is 
only possible to change the behaviour of actor-users institutionally on a 
global level if their uses of the resources were previously regulated indi-
vidually through the rights of use. Thus, one of the main conditions for 
the efficacy of a policy goes back not only to the instruments the policy 
has at its disposal, but also and probably primarily to the characteristics 
of the target groups it is aimed at: it has a greater chance of having a 
substantial effect on the problem to be resolved if it targets the actors 
who hold the effective rights of use to the resource. In order to be able 
to accomplish its aim of regulating the entire resource system and not 
only one good or service in isolation, this second layer must be capable 
of relating in a sustainably and globally restrictive manner all those in 
possession of rights to the resource (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6  
Regulation of the behaviour of the holders of collective use rights  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By doing this, these rules construct an institutional mechanism that is 
capable of defining and redefining the individual use rights correspond-
ing to the quantities – variable in time and space – of resources, the 
admissible extraction of which is defined politically. In other words, 
this regulation should provide a restrictive mechanism for the attribu-
tion, redistribution, and quantitative and qualitative redefinition of 
individual quotas on the basis of global quotas [Knoepfel 2000c]. Fig-
ure 7 presents in schematic form two possible opposing mechanisms for 
the shifts from a global quota to individual quotas. 
 
Stock
Harvest
Actor users
Good / service used
Rule ensuring exploitation (« right of use ») (layer 1)
Rule(s) ensuring the restrictive coordination of use rights between users (layer 2)
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Figure 7  
Models for shifts from a global quota to individual quotas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The "symmetrical" model considers all of the goods and services used a 
priori as "legitimate" and contents itself with redefining them in a re-
strictively symmetrical way. In such a model, which is based on the 
symmetry of sacrifices, the inequalities with respect to access and rights 
of use of the resource are maintained proportionally in the case of re-
duction of the global quota and, therefore, of individual quotas. Con-
versely, the "redistributive" model takes the view that some uses are 
more crucial or simply more opportune than others and that these 
should be prioritized in the case of a reduction of the global quota. 
Therefore, the shift from the global quota to the different individual 
quotas (through goods and services) involves a choice that is politically 
more costly and consists in the reallocation – possibly through the 
expropriation of previous holders of use rights – of the resource units 
that were previously allocated to secondary uses to the more important 
uses.12 
                                                          
12 Cf. for other modes: Varone [2002]. 
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3 Institutional Natural Resource Re-
gimes (INRR): Theoretical Bases 
As clearly stated in the first section, from both an analytical perspective 
and that of the reform of public action, traditional public policies for 
environmental protection inadequately account for the complexity of 
natural resource management, particularly within the relatively new 
framework of sustainable development. We need a new conceptual 
framework to facilitate a more suitable reading of this complexity while 
still maintaining the advantages of policy-based analysis with its focus 
on coalitions of actors, the resources at their disposal (political, social, 
financial etc.), and the institutions that structure the restrictions and 
scope of their actions [Knoepfel et al. 2001a: 70 ff.]. In our view, this 
analytical framework should also incorporate the insights from resource 
economics presented above and address the role of the use rights that 
actors hold for a given good or service. Moreover, it makes sense to link 
these different rights analytically by means of restrictive coordination 
mechanisms, thereby reflecting the physical links that exist amongst 
themselves as well as the reproductive capacity of a given resource sys-
tem.  
In searching for a conceptual framework capable of accommodating 
these sets of regulations – formal and informal, institutionalized or in 
the process of becoming so, centred on intentional actors whose behav-
iour is likely to be controlled or influenced by public policy [Berthelot 
1990; Knoepfel et al. 2001a; Scharpf 1997] – we have found a suitable 
theory to complement that of public policies: resource institutional 
economics and property rights theory (cf. in particular Bromley [1991, 
1992]; Devlin and Grafton [1998]; Endres and Querner [1993]; Os-
trom [1990, 2000, 2002]; Schlager and Ostrom [1992]; Siebert 
[1983]). This approach is appropriately preoccupied with the issue of 
use rights, their definition, their allocation, and their redistribution. It 
addresses the rules governing the behaviour of the holders of property 
rights and consideres these rights not only from an economic perspec-
tive, but also, and above all, from that of the sustainable management 
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of natural resources. The crucial importance of property rights for the 
sustainable management of resources can be explained by the fact that 
the latter constitute common property or common pool resources 
[Holzinger 2002; Ostrom 1990], which, unlike public goods, are char-
acterized by use rivalries and by the impossibility of excluding entire 
social groups from their enjoyment or exploitation; this impossibility is 
the result of either their physical characteristics or categorical normative 
imperatives. Therefore, for this branch of research, the critical collective 
action in terms of the degree of sustainability of our development re-
sides essentially in the (good or bad) definition of these rights [Coase 
1960], and in the (more or less adequate) mechanisms adopted for the 
allocation of these rights.  
Thus, the combination of these two approaches enables us to describe, 
analyze and explain the problems of the sustainable natural resource 
management outlined above which, according to the preceding ac-
count, are rarely made compatible with the theoretical frameworks 
familiar to us as political scientists. For reasons explained elsewhere 
[Knoepfel et al. 2003: 31 ff.], we have named this new analytical 
framework "institutional natural resource regimes" (INRR). In accor-
dance with the ideas presented in section 2, these regimes incorporate 
all of the formal and informal rules that regulate all of the different uses 
(in terms of goods and services) of a resource system in the context of a 
given area. The crucial characteristics of these regimes, which determine 
the sustainable or unsustainable character of resource management and 
use, can only be successfully identified through theoretical reflection 
and regular empirical observation. 
To do this, the concept of institutional regimes combines the contribu-
tions of the theoretical approaches of policy analysis, on the one hand, 
and institutional resource economics, on the other, with a view to pro-
Institutional Natural Resource Regimes (INRR): Theoretical Bases 
  29 
posing an analytical framework that can overcome their respective 
individual limitations (Table 1). 13  
The theory of property rights developed, in particular at the "Work-
shop in political theory and policy analysis" directed by Elinor Ostrom 
at the University of Indiana at Bloomington (USA), essentially results 
from the detailed analysis of institutional arrangements (mechanisms 
for the definition and attribution of property rights and for (auto) 
control of their implementation). These institutional arrangements are 
based on a communal definition of property (common property), as 
prevails, for example, in the case of irrigation systems, common pasture 
lands in the Swiss Alps (Allmende), fisheries, hunting leases etc., and 
have historically demonstrated their capacity to guarantee the sustain-
able use of a resource by local self-organized groups. 
                                                          
13 Cf. for more details and literature: Kissling-Näf and Varone [2000]; Knoepfel et al. 
[2001a]; Knoepfel et al. [2003]; Nahrath [2003a]; Gerber [2005]; Bressers and Kux 
[2004]. 
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Table 1 
Contributions and limits of the policy analysis approach to the 
analysis of the political and institutional regulation for the use of 
natural resources 
 
                                                          
14 See section 1. 
15 Cf. Knoepfel et al. [2001b: 142 ff.]. 
16 Cf. Table 3. 
 Contributions (theoretical and  
normative) 
Limits (theoretical and normative)14 
Po
lic
y 
an
al
ys
is/
pu
bl
ic
 a
ct
io
n 
• Conceptual instruments suitable 
for the analysis of the modes of 
state intervention/regulation (tak-
ing inton account the interventions 
of political-administrative actors). 
• Identification and analysis of the 
six products of a policy: problem 
definition (PD), political-
administrative programme (PAP), 
action plan (AP), political-
administrative arrangement (PAA), 
outputs and evaluative statements 
(ES).15 
• Capacity to conceptualize complex 
use situations, including heteroge-
neous rivalries (shared uses), in 
which policies play a central role.16
• Sectoral approach to the phenomena 
arising from the artificial logic of the 
division of the world produced by the 
policies themselves. 
• Difficulty in conceptualizing the 
coordination between protection poli-
cies and use policies. 
• Conception of environmental policies 
as remedial policies rather than pre-
ventive ones. 
• Focus on the management of pollut-
ant emissions insufficient to guaran-
tee the integrated protection and 
management of resources. 
• Failure to take property rights into 
account making it difficult to under-
stand the main obstacles to policy 
implementation arising from the so-
cial and political resistance exerted by 
the target groups who hold property 
rights to the regulated resources. 
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Table 2 
Contributions and limits of institutional economics to the analysis of 
of the political and institutional regulation for the use of natural 
resources 
 
 Contributions (theoretical and 
normative) 
Limits (theoretical and normative) 
In
sti
tu
tio
na
l r
es
ou
rc
e 
ec
on
om
ic
s/
 
th
eo
ry
 o
f p
ro
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
 
• Resource-based approach 
founded on the concepts of 
"resource" and "goods and 
services". 
• Capacity to envisage the 
coordinated and global man-
agement of the resource and 
all of its uses (anticipatory ap-
proach). 
• Clear conceptual definition of 
(ecological and economic) 
"sustainability". 
• Focus on the institutional 
arrangements and the property 
rights as 
form/vector/instrument of the 
regulation processes. 
• Establishment of an explana-
tory link between over-
exploitation of resources and 
the absence of property rights 
(e.g. air, landscape, genetic re-
sources, global commons etc.). 
 
• The validity of the common 
pool resources (CPR) approach 
is limited to use situations in-
volving a homogeneous group 
of users (common use), i.e. 
difficulty of analyzing situa-
tions involving multiple or 
shared uses.17 
• Ideological bias favouring 
solutions involving local and 
self-organized regulations (re-
jection of the relevance of 
market or state regulation). 
• Ignorance of state regulations 
(policies). 
• Reductive typology of prop-
erty regimes due to the ab-
sence of legal analysis. 
 
                                                          
17 Cf. Table 3. 
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One can hypothesize that there is a link between the type of use situa-
tions of a resource and the theoretical approach or approaches relevant 
to their analysis. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the institutional 
economics approach is particularly well suited to use situations de-
scribed as "common", in which several users find themselves in the 
position of rivals competing for one and the same good or service pro-
vided by a natural resource. Table 3 suggests that the institutional re-
gimes approach is more relevant for the analysis of use situations de-
scribed as "joint", in which several users find themselves as rivals with 
respect to the heterogeneous uses of one and the same resource. Con-
tractual arrangements based on civil law are generally used for the regu-
lation of the two other far less complex situations involving "individ-
ual" and "multiple" uses.  
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Table 3 
Positioning of the INRR approach based on resource use situations 
with examples 
 
Types of use 
(in terms of goods and services used) 
Classification of 
use situations 
(based on the 
example of water) Homogenous Uses Heterogeneous Uses 
 
Individual 
user or 
group of 
users  
 
"Individual use" 
Example: (exclusive) use of a 
private source for the produc-
tion of drinking water. 
"Multiple uses" 
Example: construction of a 
communal dyke with the dual 
function of flood protection 
and constitution of water 
reserves. 
N
um
be
r o
f u
se
rs
 
 
Several users 
or groups of 
users 
"Common use" 
Example: division of a flowing 
water body between farmers 
within an irrigation system. 
Self organized Common Pool 
Resources (CPR) regime (Os-
trom) 
"Joint uses" 
Example: definition of mini-
mum flows to be respected by a 
hydro-electric power plant so as 
to protect the biotopes of the 
fish populations and to guaran-
tee the supply of the irrigation 
system of farmers located 
upstream. 
Institutional Natural Resource 
Regimes (INRR) 
Source: Knoepfel et al. [2001b: 16], based on Young [1992: 103]. 
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4 The Concept of Institutional Natu-
ral Resource Regimes (INRR) 
The INRR concept as applied to the resources soil [Nahrath 2003a, 
2003b]; water [Reynard and Mauch 2003; Bressers and Kuks 2004; 
Kissling-Näf and Kuks 2004], forest [Bisang and Schenkel 2003]; land-
scape [Gerber 2005; Rodewald et al. 2005]; air [Mariéthoz and Savary 
2004; Savary and Knoepfel 2005] and built heritage [Knoepfel and 
Kohler 2005] is composed of two types of regulation (public policies 
and property rights). Its dynamic depends on two dimensions, extent 
and coherence, both of which may vary in time and space according to 
the type of regime that prevails. In this section, we shall examine the 
main characteristics of this concept and refer to more detailed publica-
tions for in-depth information. 
4.1 Policies and property rights 
The concept of institutional natural resource regimes is primarily a 
framework for the analysis of institutional arrangements concerning the 
regulation of the collective and individual uses of a resource. This regu-
lation is generally highly complex and composed of legislation and 
parliamentary, administrative or legal implementation decisions origi-
nating from several levels of the state (i.e. municipal, cantonal, federal 
and sometimes even international). It brings together the public rules, 
whose objective is the regulation of the behaviour of actor-users of 
goods and services originating from a resource system, the boundary of 
which is generally regional. These rules appear either in substantial 
policies intended to tackle collective problems associated with the pro-
tection or exploitation of the resources in question or in the basic prop-
erty rights order18 which is far more stable as it is based on (quasi) con-
stitutional decisions or civil law (Swiss Civil Code) and rooted in po-
litical convictions that concern fundamental rights, social justice, and 
                                                          
18 Eigentumsrechtliche Grundordnung in German. 
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the basis of the economic, political and social functioning of our soci-
ety. An institutional regime represents a combination of these two types 
of regulation, i.e. (a) policies contained in what we call the policy de-
sign (PD); and (b) all of the property rights contained in what we call 
the regulatory system (RS). The contribution of these two types of regu-
lation may vary significantly according to the resources in question and 
historical periods of the development of a regime, which is why it is 
possible to identify historically regimes that are essentially based on the 
regulatory system ("property rights driven regimes") and, conversely 
those based on policy ("policy driven regimes").19 
 
Policies (policy design) 
The policies that constitute an institutional regime contain all of the 
substantial and institutional elements relative to the programming and 
implementation of all of the different use and protection policies affect-
ing the management of a resource. The different constitutive elements 
of this kind of policy design are:20 
• The definition of the different collective problem(s) to be resolved based 
on the periods being analyzed, and the different objectives sought 
by the related state intervention. The policy design is often the 
product of a historical process involving the sometimes uncoordi-
nated accumulation and sedimentation of the successive defini-
tions of the collective problems to be resolved. 
• The causal and intervention hypotheses forming the causal models, 
which change as a function of the variations in time and space of 
the definition of the problems to be addressed. The causal model 
defines the actors (target group) considered responsible for the ex-
istence of the problem and the modes of intervention believed ca-
pable of producing the desired changes in the behaviour of the 
target group(s), thus enabling the resolution or attenuation of the 
                                                          
19 Kissling-Näf and Varone [2000b]. 
20 Knoepfel et al. [2001: 101 ff.]. 
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problem and hence an improvement of the situation of those who 
suffer due to the existence of this problem (i.e. end beneficiaries). 
• The target groups and the beneficiaries of the various public policies 
constitutive of the policy design that form, together with the in-
tervening political-administrative actors, the "basic triangle" of pol-
icy actors. 
• The instruments (regulatory, economic, persuasive, etc.) produced 
according to the different intervention hypotheses and used in the 
implementation of the policies in question. 
• The political-administrative arrangements involved in the implemen-
tation of the policies in question. These arrangements generally 
involve one or more municipal, cantonal and/or federal adminis-
trative services with a portfolio of various resources and are more 
or less coordinated (horizontally or vertically) through administra-
tive procedures. 
• The actual outputs of public policies take the form of individual and 
concrete acts of application in the field of political-administrative 
legislative programmes. 
Table 4 presents the different policy elements and provides a few ex-
amples using policies concerning the resource water. 
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Table 4 
Regulation through policies: the elements of the policy design 
 
Policy design (PD) (all 
of the policies govern-
ing the use and pro-
tection of a resource) 
 
Examples: resource water 
(historical evolution 20th century21) 
Definition of collective 
problems to be re-
solved and objectives 
of the state interven-
tion  
• Floods 
• Pollution of water bodies  
• Strong increase in the quantity of water consumed per 
capita, reduction of groundwater levels 
• Drying up of water bodies and destruction of aquatic 
ecosystems down stream of dams 
• Diffuse pollution of surface and underground water 
bodies (run-off and elutriation of agricultural soils) 
Causal and interven-
tion hypotheses 
• Correction of water courses and draining of wetlands 
• Mechanical reoxygenation of lakes 
• Systematic treatment of waste water prior to disposal 
• Reduction of pollutants contained in industrial and 
household water 
• Introduction of the "polluter pays" principle 
• Fight against non-point source pollution due to inten-
sive agriculture 
• Obligation to maintain a minimum flow in rivers 
• Renaturation of water courses 
Target groups Industries (in particular chemical industries), households, 
dam operators, farmers, owners of waste disposal sites and 
contaminated sites etc. 
Instruments • Mandatory connection to a treatment plant 
• Ban on phosphates in detergent products 
• Measures for the extensification of agriculture, re-
stricted access to fertilizers 
• Minimum flow rates 
                                                          
21 According to Reynard et al. [2001: 101 ff.]. 
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Policy design (PD) (all 
of the policies govern-
ing the use and pro-
tection of a resource) 
 
Examples: resource water 
(historical evolution 20th century21) 
• Purification taxes 
• Separation of clean and waste water collection 
Political-administrative 
arrangements 
• Regional and local implementation 
• Creation of specialized administrations 
Outputs • Concessions for water withdrawal 
• Bans on the spreading of manure 
Policies constitutive of 
the policy design 
Infrastructure policies (flood banks), agricultural policy, 
policy for the qualitative protection of water, spatial plan-
ning, energy policy, nature and landscape protection policy, 
environmental policy etc. 
 
Public actors mobilise existing policies or newly created ones (change in 
the institutional regime) to modify the behaviour of the actor-users of a 
resource on the basis of the two following types of intervention or regu-
lation: 
• Type 1 modes of regulation: This involves the implementation of 
incentive-based instruments that do not have any impact on the 
content of the property and use rights of a resource’s actor-owners 
and/or actor-users. This mode of regulation includes such in-
struments as information campaigns, the payment of subsidies in 
exchange for the desired behaviour (e.g. specific ecological ser-
vices), tax relief (e.g. for cars fitted with a catalytic converter), etc.  
• Type 2 modes of regulation: This involves the implementation of 
instruments with perceptible impacts on the rights of disposal 
and/or use of actor-users by means of clarifications (often restric-
tive) of the content of these rights. The most widespread exam-
ples of intervention involving rights of disposal are the restrictions 
on the circulation of property titles in the form of bans on the 
sale or purchase of these titles by certain categories of buyers (for 
example, bans on the sale of agricultural land to non-farmers or 
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on the sale of a plot of land to individuals intending to use it for 
the construction of a holiday property etc.), or restrictions on 
rights of rental or transfer of a property to people who are not 
suitably qualified to take care of it. Far more common, however, 
are the multiple and very varied restrictions on use rights such as, 
for example, restrictions on construction, on the emission of at-
mospheric pollutants or liquids, on harvesting (wood, rare plants 
and game), and on rights of access (to lakeshores, forests and frag-
ile biotopes). These restrictions are aimed at actor-users who hold 
formal property title or rights of disposal or of derived use (con-
cessions, leases etc.). 
Figure 8 is a schematic representation of these two modes of regulation 
and intervention based on public policies (policy design). 
Figure 8 
Regulation of resource exploitation through the policy design (PD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Knoepfel and Nahrath [2002]. 
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Property rights (regulatory system) 
A property regime (or regulatory system) is composed of all of the for-
mal property rights, as well as all of the rights of disposal and use aris-
ing from them, that apply to a resource. The content of these disposal 
and use rights depends on the definition of property used by the society 
in question (e.g. private, collective/communal) and applicable to this 
resource. An analysis of the property regime applies just as well to the 
entire resource system as it does to the individual units used to provide 
the different goods and services. 
Table 5 shows the range of regulations based on property rights (com-
ponents of the regulatory system) using the example of the resource 
ground/soil (ground law). 
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Table 5 
Regulation through property rights: the components of the  
regulatory system 
 
Regulatory System  
(all property rights) Examples based on the resource ground/soil22 
Formal property rights Land ownership title 
Rights of disposal Right to: 
• sale 
• gift 
• rental (leasing) 
• mortgage 
• inheritance 
• etc. 
one's real estate. 
Use rights Right to: 
• construct on 
• deposit (waste) on 
• use (agriculture) 
• destroy 
• protect 
•  etc. 
one’s real estate. 
 
When public actors consider these rights as ineffective, too costly in 
administrative terms, or simply no longer corresponding to the prevail-
ing political values, they may try to resolve the problems associated 
with the use of goods and services through the modification of these 
rights. Compared to policy changes, such a strategy is sometimes con-
                                                          
22 According to Nahrath [2003a]. 
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sidered more long-lasting, less fragile, and more likely to improve the 
predictability of these regulations, as well as the framework conditions 
that promote a good climate for investment. This kind of more radical 
and sometimes even revolutionary change modifies the institutional 
regimes through the restructuring of their regulatory system on the 
basis of the following two possible modes of regulation and/or interven-
tion: 
• Type 3 modes of regulation: This involves different types of possi-
ble modifications of the definition of the institution of formal 
property that have an impact on the scope and content of the dis-
posal and use rights of all holders of such rights. The most impor-
tant example occurred with the introduction of the Swiss Civil 
Code in 1907, which created a unified definition of property 
rights at the federal level and abolished in one fell swoop the old 
use and disposal rights, particularly in the area of ground law. 
More recent examples include the introduction into the Civil 
Code of the law of condominium ownership (1965) and the in-
troduction of the new property regime (1969) through the 
Bodenrechtsartikel (constitutional guarantee of real estate prop-
erty), which practically established the principle of the right of 
compensation in the case of material expropriation in the Swiss 
Federal Constitution.23 
• Type 4 modes of regulation: This involves different possible forms 
of intervention of a general nature or, conversely, affecting a par-
ticular area whose objective is to redefine the structure of distribu-
tion of property titles. These modes may consist of both an inter-
vention as radical as the privatization or nationalization of land 
for all kinds of reasons (increased economic efficiency, efforts to 
counteract speculation or concentration and de-individualization 
of property ownership, security of supply, etc.) and a more punc-
tual and limited intervention consisting of formal expropriation 
(e.g. for the implementation of infrastructure projects) or targeted 
                                                          
23 On this point, see Nahrath [2003a, 2005]. 
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public property acquisitions (due to an active property policy at 
municipal level). 
Figure 9 contains a schematic representation of interventions made 
through the regulatory system and affecting the modes of resource 
exploitation. 
Figure 9 
Regulation of resource exploitation through the regulatory system  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Knoepfel and Nahrath [2002]. 
 
As clearly demonstrated in Figure 10, which combines Figures 8 and 9, 
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the two components of the institutional regime, i.e. the policy design 
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are by far the most common in practice, constitute the core of the insti-
tutional regimes of the principle natural resources. 
Figure 10 
The INRR as a combination of the modes of regulation by policies 
and modes of regulation by property rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Knoepfel and Nahrath [2002]. 
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Table 6 
Summary: INRR 
 
Institutional Resource Regime 
Policy Design (cumulation of all use and 
protection policies) 
Regulatory System (cumulation of all of 
the property rights concerning the re-
source and its uses) 
Definition of the social problem and political 
objectives 
Formal property rights 
Causality model (causal and intervention 
hypotheses) 
Rights of disposal 
Target groups Rights of use 
Instruments  
Political-administrative implementation 
arrangement 
 
Outputs  
 
Source: Knoepfel et al. [2001b: 36]; Nahrath [2003a: 36] 
4.2 The concepts of regime coherence and extent24 
Institutional regimes may be defined and categorized on the basis of 
their specific characteristics, particularly with the help of the dimen-
sions "extent" and "coherence" of a regime. On this basis, the concept 
of the institutional regime enables one to formulate hypotheses con-
cerning the existence of causal relations between the characteristics of a 
regime and its contribution to the sustainable or unsustainable devel-
opment of the resource, to whose regulation it contributes. 
The dimension referred to as the "extent" of a regime concerns simply 
whether or not the different goods and services of a resource actually 
                                                          
24 In accordance with Knoepfel [2003]. Cf. also Nahrath [2003a]; Bressers and Kuks 
[2004]. 
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used are regulated. The analysis is based on the idea that the lack of 
regulation of the behaviour of actor-users, through a more or less pre-
cise description of use rights via public policies and/or property rights 
defined in a regulatory system, risks engendering strategic behaviours 
that can lead to the over-exploitation of the resource during times of 
scarcity. 
Depending on the objectives pursued through the adoption of the 
INRR concept – whether for describing the general evolution of one or 
more resource regimes in time and space or, conversely, describing and 
analyzing a particular regime in action at a given place and time – the 
analysis will focus on the so-called "absolute extent" of the regime, on 
the one hand, and on its so-called "relative extent", on the other. The 
first makes it possible to take into account historical changes regarding 
the number of goods and services effectively regulated by the federal 
and possibly cantonal components of an institutional regime. Here, the 
absolute extent constitutes a good indicator for identifying periods of 
regime change corresponding to an increase or decreasing of the num-
ber of goods and services regulated by a regime. Moreover, it lends itself 
to international or interregional comparisons of regimes from the per-
spective of the number of goods and services effectively covered by such 
regulations. Conversely, the relative extent, which represents a quotient 
relating the number of goods and services regulated with the number of 
goods and services actually used in a given area at a given moment in 
time, tends to be used in the analysis of active empirical regimes. If this 
quotient is less than 1, the existence of unregulated rivalries may be 
expected and, therefore, the resource is at risk of over-exploitation. In 
the opposite case, a situation of over-regulation prevails, which may 
also pose problems, above all on the level of the economic modes of 
exploitation of the resource (lack of allocative efficiency). In the empiri-
cal world, regimes can often be observed that are characterized by an 
excessively weak absolute extent. This is due to the fact that in the 
majority of cases the regulation of use behaviours only emerges as a 
reactive measure and very often when it is too late, i.e. after a particular 
use has developed to a point at which it represents a serious threat to 
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the reproductive capacity of the resource (e.g. CO2 immissions and 
climate change). 
The criterion of coherence is based on the content and connection of 
the regulations established by the regime. It presupposes, firstly, that 
the definition of individual use rights, created by the public policies 
and/or property rights, does not exceed the global quota of the goods 
and services considered extractable without putting the reproductive 
capacity of the stock at risk.25 Incoherencies between these regulations 
will be more likely to emerge as their number increases (i.e. elevated 
absolute extent). Such incoherencies may be due to regulations origi-
nating in the regulatory system and/or public policies or the connection 
between the two. Thus, we make a distinction between three types of 
coherences/incoherencies: 
• The internal coherence of the regulatory system concerns the degree of 
clarity of the definition of the property titles or the use rights aris-
ing from them. While property rights are generally clearly defined 
for resources such as water or soil, they are far less clearly defined 
in the case of resources considered "ownerless property" from a 
legal point of view and in the case of resources that do not belong 
to the category of "material objects" according to the Civil Code, 
such as landscape, biodiversity or air. For example, incoherencies 
in the regulatory system may originate from the fact that there are 
more property titles or use rights for a single resource or a single 
good or service than resource units available or extractable in ac-
cordance with the definition of the global maximum quota. Such 
situations regularly exist in the case of the resource air (e.g. unlim-
ited use rights assigned with vehicle licensing certificates) or the 
resource water (e.g. the unregulated free pumping of water from 
the water table for private bore holes).  
• The internal coherence of the policy design concerns the coordination 
between policies governing the use and protection of natural re-
                                                          
25 In the sense of layer 2 in Figure 6. 
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sources. In the 1990s,26 this was frequently very weak and some-
times even non-existent (e.g. the contradiction between the en-
ergy policy and the policy for the liberalization of the electricity 
market). Conversely, contradictions within the same policy – for 
example, between the problem definition, the causal hypotheses 
adopted, the choice of target groups, the definition of interven-
tion instruments, the capacity for action of the political-
administrative arrangement etc. – are more rare. Incoherent pol-
icy designs normally produce regulations that are incompatible 
with each other in relation to the different goods and services. 
• External coherence concerns the mode of connection between the 
two components of a regime. It is expressed particularly through 
the correspondence between the target groups of the policy design 
and the holders of rights in accordance with the regulatory sys-
tem. This correspondence is lacking when policies address target 
groups that do not have use rights and whose eventual changes in 
behaviour do not have any real effect on the actual uses of the re-
source. Other external incoherencies consist in the relatively 
common case whereby policies simply do not have sufficient co-
ercive power to actually restrict the use rights of the users of a re-
source. An example of this is the incapacity to impose the mini-
mum flow rates stipulated in the legislation on the protection of 
water (institutional regime for water) on the holders of dam con-
cessions. Another example is the capacity of land owners to resist 
the implementation of zoning in the context of landuse planning 
(institutional regime for land and soil). Empirical research shows 
that a good indicator of the external incoherence of a regime is 
the "judicialization" of the implementation of the policy design 
[Rothmayr 2000, Nahrath 2005], and in the central role played 
by the jurisprudence of the courts in connecting the two compo-
nents of the regime. 
                                                          
26 See section 1. 
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Thus, the identification of gaps or incoherencies in a regime often helps 
to explain the empirically observed phenomena associated with over-
exploitation. 
4.3 Typology of regimes and their repercussions 
for sustainable development 
As stated above, the two key dimensions of extent and coherence enable 
an initial relatively simple typology of institutional regimes to be de-
fined and hypotheses concerning the existence of possible links between 
their characteristics, as well as their supposedly variable contribution to 
the sustainable management of a resource to be established. 
Figure 11 identifies the four main types of regime, which we describe as 
follows: 
• Non-existent regime: Situation whereby the resource does not have 
any kind of property right associated with it or any kind of regulation 
of any of its goods and services by any kind of policy. Such a situation 
prevails, for example, when the need to regulate a resource has not been 
politically acknowledged despite the fact that the resource is subject to a 
range of exploitation. The empirical identification of situations involv-
ing non-existent regimes is only possible through the screening of insti-
tutional regimes for very long periods. Non-existent regimes may be 
encountered, for example, in the area of the resource air or landscape 
during the periods preceding the introduction of the legislation to 
counteract atmospheric pollution or prior to the constitutional recogni-
tion in 1962 of the need to protect the landscape.27 
                                                          
27 Swiss Federal Constitution of 18 April 1999 (RS 101) (preamble and Art. 73). 
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Figure 11 
The four main types of institutional natural resource regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (inter alia) Knoepfel et al. [2001:38]. 
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volve the creation of an initial body of property rights (creation 
of the Swiss federal civil law in the early 20th century) inde-
pendent of the existence of any policies. Such a regime may 
equally be the result of the "disintegration" of a previously com-
plex or integrated regime. Moreover, in many cases, the raison 
d'être of such regimes is not the protection of the resource, but 
instead, as shown in section 2, that of guaranteeing access to the 
resource in the long term with a view to its economic exploita-
tion or to the amortization of the operating installations re-
quired within a concession regime. 
• Complex regime: Situation whereby the majority of the goods and 
services actually used are regulated, but in a way that is incoher-
ent in part. This situation corresponds to most of the late 20th 
century regimes in Switzerland due to the extensive develop-
ment of sectoral use and protection policies from the 1950s 
which are largely uncoordinated. Such a regime may also be the 
result of the disintegration of a previously integrated regime. 
Unlike simple regimes, according to the empirical data avail-
able, complex regimes are essentially the outcome of a political 
mobilization that aims to deal with problems surrounding re-
source rivalry and reproduction, the resolution of which, it is as-
sumed, lies in the introduction of more regulations governing 
the goods and services of the resource in question. These re-
gimes all involve more or less advanced attempts to formulate 
quotas by use sector, at least at the level of the goods and/or ser-
vices regulated. From the perspective of resource economics, 
these regimes are characterized, however, by flawed mechanisms 
for the coordination of global quotas with the individual quotas 
(by use sector). 
• Integrated regime: Situation whereby all of the goods and services 
produced by a resource and actually used are regulated in a co-
herent way. According to our research findings, such regimes 
remain very rare in the early 21st century. Examples in Switzer-
land may be found in the areas of landscape [Rodewald et al. 
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2005: 347 ff.; Gerber 2005: 374 ff.], forest [Bisang and Schen-
kel 2003: 198 ff.] and water (in the course of being integrated 
[Reynard and Mauch 2003]). Such regimes are found, in par-
ticular, where resources are largely in public ownership (e.g. for-
ests) or under the control of a powerful collective actor (e.g. self 
governing CPR institutions [Ostrom 1990] like a Bourgeoisie 
or an Allmende association, or nature conservation organization 
such as Pro Natura). 
The main hypothesis of the INRR concept is based on this typology. It 
presupposes the existence of a causal relationship between, on the one 
hand, the regime type (i.e. its extent and coherence) and its regulatory 
capacity, and, on the other, the sustainability of the uses arising from 
the regime’s resources as well as status of the resulting reproductive 
capacity of the resource system. More concretely, the closer a resource 
situation moves towards an integrated regime, the greater the likelihood of 
creating sustainable use conditions for the resource. Conversely, the less 
developed the regime is, i.e. the less elevated its coherence and extent (in 
particular relative), the greater the risks of over-exploitation of the resource. 
The validity of this research hypothesis has been largely confirmed by 
the empirical research carried out in this area up to now.28 
                                                          
28 For a synthesis of these studies, cf. Knoepfel, Kissling-Naef and Varone [2003]. 
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5 Empirical Applications 
The uses or empirical/practical applications of the institutional regime 
concept may be both scientific (analytical) and normative (prescriptive) 
in nature. Thus we will present two applications of the concept in the 
remaining section of this chapter. The first is a guide for carrying out 
an analysis of the existing empirical regulation of the uses of a resource 
from the perspective of institutional regimes. The second, more norma-
tive one, proposes a usable framework for the development of (new) 
institutional regimes based on the more sustainable management of 
natural resources. 
5.1 Applications of the INRR concept to the analy-
sis of the empirical regulation of situations 
involving the exploitation of natural resources 
The model shown in Figure 12 constitutes the chronological process of 
the implementation of strategic choices in the context of the emergence 
of a public intervention measure leading to the adoption of an institu-
tional regime which regulates the uses of a given resource. 
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Figure 12 
Guide for the analysis of existing regulations from the perspective 
of institutional regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process proposed here is based on an empirical analysis of the 
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which are defined in absolute and inflexible terms as though the re-
source in question were any kind of material object. Thus, the re-
searcher distinguishes between these rights, which have no "resource-
based connotation", and use regulations that refer explicitly to a re-
source framework and define the use rights as a function of the repro-
ductive capacity of the resource in question.  
Amongst the regulations with a resource-based reference, the research 
may distinguish, in empirical reality, three different modes of formula-
tion of such regulations. The first mode consists in the definition of 
quotas for global extractions that are not extended systematically and 
restrictively to individual use rights. The protection of the resource air 
illustrates well such a situation in that the global quotas defined by law 
in the form of ambient air quality standards (Swiss Federal Law on the 
Protection of the Environment of 7 October 1983) are not systemati-
cally translated into legally binding restrictions in the form of individ-
ual emissions when the quality standards are exceeded.29 In such cases, 
the immission limit value will act as an indicative value rather than 
restrictive value. The regulatory modes governing such situations tend 
to be incoherent in nature. 
Conversely, we may find situations in which individual use rights are 
defined independently of the definition of a global quota. Such concep-
tions are based on the idea that individual quotas may be regulated in a 
way that ensures their combined use remains, even in extreme cases, 
within the limits of sustainability for the use in question. The system of 
(daily) fishing licenses, and, more worryingly, the system of the unlim-
ited allocation of vehicle licensing certificates, which is independent of 
any definition of a global quota for registrations that would make it 
possible to protect the air’s auto-reproductive capacity, constitute two 
examples of this situation. Here too, the modes of regulation involved 
tend to be incoherent. 
                                                          
29 Despite a provision contained in the Swiss Ordinance on Air Pollution Control of 16 
December 1985 which stipulates a systematic adaptation of this kind by the cantons.  
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Between these two extreme cases, we find the mode of regulation most 
able to provide an institutional guarantee of the sustainable manage-
ment of natural resources. It consists of global quotas and individual 
use rights and is equipped with a mechanism for creating coherence 
between the two types of quotas, which is indispensable to the emer-
gence of an integrated regime. It is, however, also possible to find inco-
herent modes of regulation here when, as seen in the example given in 
section 3, individual quotas are defined, the sum of which exceeds the 
global quota. Again, such situations may exist in the context of the 
resource air when the regulations define immission and emission limit 
values independently of the number of pollutant sources. The coordi-
nation of a global quota with all of the individual use rights (which 
corresponds to a situation of integrated institutional regimes) may only 
be established if the number of regulated uses corresponds to the num-
ber of actual uses in the area in question.  
It should be noted that the empirical validity of the INRR conceptual 
framework can be tested via the process described in figure 12. Its ap-
plication highlights the existent or non-existent relationships between 
the characteristics of the regime, the reproductive capacity of the re-
source, and the regime’s effects on the actual uses of the resource. Up to 
now, this test, which has been implemented by our team over the past 
six years with the help of numerous local case studies, has revealed an 
explanatory link that fulfils the key dimensions of the institutional 
resource regimes concept, both in diachronic studies (i.e. historical 
screening) and synchronic studies (i.e. detailed examinations of the 
phases of regime change and their concrete impacts on the management 
of resources). 
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5.2 The normative use of the concept of institu-
tional regimes as a platform for the develop-
ment of (new) institutional regulations aimed 
at the more sustainable management of natu-
ral resources 
In this final section, we describe in broad and prescriptive terms the 
seven decisional stages necessary for the creation of an integrated insti-
tutional regime for a resource. Each of these stages is based on impor-
tant political choices, of which the actors involved must be fully aware. 
This requires awareness-raising and participation processes in the form 
of, for example, sustainability processes within Agenda 21 projects. 
Table 7 presents these different stages in a general form. 
Table 7 
The seven stages of the decision-making process in the creation of 
an integrated institutional regime for a given resource 
 
1 Political construction of the resource 
• Political definition of the problem (scarcity, identification of rivalries between the 
different uses etc.). 
• Identification of the boundary relevant to the management of the resource. 
• Formulation of a causal hypothesis: identification of actor-users. 
• Inventorization of existing use rights. 
2 Political definition of the (annual) quantity of resource units available 
• Scientific-political consensus on the volume currently available for extraction. 
• Political decision concerning measures enabling the artificial increase/decrease of 
this quantity (extension of boundary, etc.). 
• Definition of global quota of resource units authorized for withdrawal/extraction. 
3 Evaluation of the legal scope of the definition of the global quota 
• Coercive quota 
• Indicative quota 
• Reference framework in the event of conflicts (to be applied by the courts, for ex-
ample). 
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4 Decision concerning the modes of "translation" of the global quota into individual 
quotas 
• Through partial global quotas (for example, types of activities or types of territory 
etc.). 
• Directly from the global quota to individual use rights. 
5 Decisions concerning the modes of modification of use rights 
• Modification of civil law or ownership rights. 
• Changes in public law (limitation of ownership etc.). 
• Introduction of flexibility clauses (variable use rights according to the definition 
(variable in time) of the global quota). 
 
• Weighting of the desirable relationship between social, economic and ecological 
sustainability (equal weighting, in accordance with the Federal Swiss Constitu-
tion). 
• Political choices necessary to modify use rights in accordance with the postulates 
that concretize these three dimensions of sustainability by area. 
6 Decision concerning the definition of new use rights (in accordance with the principles 
decided under 5) 
• Definition of eligible actor-users per good and service. 
• Degree of exclusivity of rights. 
• Specific flexibility clauses. 
• Exchangeability, transferability. 
• Spatial or temporal limitation (boundaries). 
• Etc. 
7 Institutionalization of monitoring 
• Monitoring of the reproductive capacity of the resource in question over time (so as 
to evaluate the quality of the global quota definition and possibly adjust it). 
• Monitoring of the actual evolution of the global quota (so as to evaluate or possibly 
adjust the definition of individual quotas). 
• Monitoring of the actual behaviour of actor users in light of individual quotas (so as 
to evaluate the capacity of the individual quotas to actually steer the behaviour of 
actor users). 
 
Empirical Applications 
  61 
These seven stages in the decision-making process are explained in 
detail in the preceding chapters, thus we will not explain the table in 
detail here. Every reader, practitioner or academic can easily find exam-
ples corresponding to one or other of these stages in their professional 
experience. Of course, only the future will show us the scope and acuity 
of the real problems involved in the application of such integrated 
regulations, problems that reside in the regulatory system founded on 
the guarantee of private and/or exclusive property which is strongly 
rooted in political and legal institutions and in Swiss political mores 
[Aubin, Nahrath and Varone 2004]. Indeed, the highlighting of this 
dimension is one of the main contributions of this analytical frame-
work. It should nevertheless be noted that this concept, which is simple 
and obvious to all of those concerned with sustainable development, 
has already met with a certain level of response, albeit still very abstract, 
for example in the strategy of the Swiss Office for the Environment, 
Forests and Landscape.30 Similarly, the European "Euwareness" project 
has shown that the European Water Framework Directive of 23 Octo-
ber 2000 (2000/60/EU) heads in the same direction as the ideas dis-
cussed here on the subject of the necessary integration of institutional 
regimes [Aubin and Varone 2004]. Finally, the processes for the re-
gional planning of forests currently under way in Switzerland also show 
astonishing similarities with our concept of institutional regimes. As 
showed elsewhere [Knoepfel 2005], there is moreover a clear interest in 
its analogous application to the area of local Agenda 21 sustainable 
development processes currently under way (summer 2005) in over 130 
Swiss municipalities [DuPasquier et al. 2003]. 
                                                          
30 See OFEFP [2005]. 
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6 By way of conclusion … 
This last application clearly shows that the analytical framework of 
institutional regimes for natural resources is not solely a conceptual 
analytical tool with dimensions likely to influence the sustainability of a 
resource or the social, ecological and economic sustainability relative to 
its use. The following chapters show that this concept is also a poten-
tially relevant political-administrative management tool which will 
make it possible to improve the efficacy of the regulations and behav-
iours of the actor-users of natural resources from the perspective of 
increasing sustainability. If taken seriously – as made possible by the 
concept of institutional regimes – the latter is far from merely being a 
new intellectual fad enabling dominant social groups to better relativize 
the requirements of environmental protection which today are often 
considered as inflated.31 On the contrary, when applied to natural 
resources, the concept of institutional regimes makes it possible to 
implement some key elements of the constitutional principle of sustain-
able development in the form of relatively precise actions. Of course, 
they will need to be described in greater detail in the future in the con-
text of action research within pilot projects. The concept lends itself to 
areas as wide-ranging as future natural regional parks [Gerber 2004; 
Gerber 2005; Oppizzi 2003], the battle against atmospheric pollution 
in urban regions [Mariéthoz and Savary 2004], the regional planning 
processes for forests in accordance with Article 18 of the Ordinance on 
Forests of 30 November 1992 (RS 921.01), climate policy (already very 
advanced implementation of CO2 regimes at European level in accor-
dance with Directive 2003/87/EU of 13 October 2003), the truly 
effective battle against urban sprawl and the waste of land [ARE 2005], 
                                                          
31 These anti-ecological ideas were introduced into the Swiss political agenda at the 
beginning of this century by political parties such as the Swiss People’s Party (Union 
démocratique du centre) and the Radical Democratic Party (Parti radical-démocratique) 
which see their beliefs vindicated by the considerable decline in interest in environ-
mental issues demonstrated by surveys on the population’s political priorities. 
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and the area of water management, in particular in countries prone to 
increasingly extended periods of drought32. 
Although the action area retained for the development of the concept 
of institutional resource regimes is primarily that of common pool re-
sources, which include natural resources, the concept should also prove 
its worth in the management of all kinds of non-natural (i.e. artificial 
and intangible) resources such as cultural, social, human, and institu-
tional resources, which are becoming increasingly important in a soci-
ety engaged in a process of dematerialization. If, as is the case with 
natural resources, we exploit these common pool resources (or artificial 
and intangible resources) in an "unchecked" manner, allowing actor-
users uncontrolled appropriation of the goods and services produced by 
them, we risk finding ourselves faced with situations of over-
exploitation as a result of the attribution of use rights to actors who 
behave primarily as predators rather than as reasonable managers of 
these resources. Such a situation of over-exploitation of common pool 
resources risks ultimately leading to violent social struggles, the waste of 
resources and their associated goods and services and, finally, to a proc-
ess of destruction of these resources which would probably exceed even 
the pessimistic prognosis formulated in 1968 by Hardin in his famous 
article "The tragedy of the commons" [Hardin 1968]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Cf. on this point the example of Spain: Costejà et al. [2004a]; Costejà et al. [2004b]. 
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Managing globalisation in public utilities: public service transnational corporations and 
the case of the global water industry, avril 1999 
178  KNOEPFEL Peter 
Natural Resource Quotas and Contracts – A New Institutional Regime for our Common 
Resources, janvier 2000 
179  AMHERDT Charles-Henri, EMERY Yves 
Le Centre en Développement de Carrière pour managers publics (CDC), décembre 1998 
180  FARINE Anouk 
Transparence de l'information officielle – impacts du principe de la publicité dans le 
canton de Bern, février 2000 
181  ISENI Bashkim 
Transition et stratégies de privatisation en Europe de l'Est. Etude de cas de la Macé-
doine, avril 1999 
182  WIDMER Conrad 
Umsetzung des Biodiversitätsübereinkommens der Vereinten Nationen; Vergleich von 
Artikel 18b -–18d des Natur- und Heimatschutzgesetzes und Artikel 31b des Landwirt-
schaftsgesetzes, octobre 1999 
183  EHRENSPERGER Marc 
Erfolgsfaktoren von Verwaltungsreform – eine Analyse anhand der Reformen in den 
Kantonen Luzern und Waadt, décembre 1999 
184  REICHEN Pascal 
Guide de projet Internet dans l'Administration, avril 2000 
185  SOGUEL Nils, van Griethuysen Pascal 
Evaluation contingente, qualité de l'air et santé: une étude en milieu urbain, avril 2000 
186  CLIVAZ Christophe 
Ecologisation de la politique agricole en Suisse et dans le canton du Valais. Analyse de 
l'influence des réseaux d'action publique sur l'évolution environnementale de la politi-
que agricole, mai 2000 
187 CLIVAZ Christophe 
Ecologisation de la politique des transports en Suisse et dans le canton du Valais. 
Analyse de l'influence des réseaux d'action publique sur l'évolution environnementale 
de la politique des transports, mai 2000 
188  GENOUD Christophe 
La régionalisation des transports publics. Implications de la nouvelle loi sur les chemins 
de fer à l’exemple des cantons de Berne, Zürich, Neuchâtel et Jura, août 2000 
189  KNOEPFEL Peter 
Rationality Changes in West European Clean Air Policies (1960-2000), juin 2000 
190  KNOEPFEL Peter 
Les paiements directs à la lumière des sciences politiques: une politique publique des 
plus fragiles, août 2000e 
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191  FROSSARD Stanislas, HAGMANN Tobias 
La réforme de la politique d'asile suisse à travers les mesures d'urgence – "Le vrai, le 
faux et le criminel", août 2000 
192  EMERY Yves, LAMBELET ROSSI, Laurence 
Les politiques du personnel: conception, analyse et recommandations pour les adminis-
trations publiques suisses: octobre 2000 
193  MAUCH Corine 
Stadtentwicklung zwischen Plan und Stadt, mars 2001 
194  HAGMANN Tobias 
Dynamiques conflictuelles résultant de l'accueil des requérants d'asile dans les commu-
nes suisses. Constats et causes, avril 2001 
196  GENOUD Christophe 
Privatization and Regulation: The Case of European Electricity, décembre 2001 
197a RODEWALD Raimund, in Zusammenarbeit mit KNOEPFEL Peter 
Regionalpolitik und ländliche Entwicklung in der Schweiz – Eine Auslegeordnung 
(deutsche Version), octobre 2001 
197b RODEWALD Raimund, in collaboration with KNOEPFEL Peter 
Regional Policy and Rural Development in Switzerland. An Overview (English version), 
décembre 2001 
197c RODEWALD Raimund, en collaboration avec KNOEPFEL Peter  
Politique régionale et développement de l'espace rural en Suisse. Etat des lieux (version 
française), juin 2002 
198  CHAPPELET Jean-Loup 
Cyberparlementaires. L'appropriation de l'Internet par les parlementaires fédéraux, 
décembre 2001 
199  SIMON Ansgar  
Die Privatisierung des Flughafens Zürich und deren Auswirkungen, octobre 2002 
200  BATORI Frédéric, PFISTER Monique, SAVARY Jérôme 
La Haute Ecole Spécialisée de Suisse Occidentale (HES-SO): démarche chaotique ou 
politique publique planifiée? juin 2002 
201  KNOEPFEL Peter 
Regulative Politik in föderativen Staaten – das Beispiel der Umweltpolitik, mai 2002 
202a FROSSARD Stanislas 
Entstehung und Entwicklung der Jugendpolitik in den Kantonen (Überblick, Tendenzen 
und Analyse), avril 2003 
202b FROSSARD Stanislas 
Emergence et développement des politiques cantonales de la jeunesse (Aperçu, tendan-
ces et analyse), avril 2003 
202c  FROSSARD Stanislas 
Nascita e sviluppo delle politiche giovanili cantonali (valutazione, tendenze e analisi), 
avril 2003 
203  EMERY Yves, HÜRLIMANN Boris 
Les processus dynamiques de l'employabilité, août 2002 
204  SAVARY Jérôme 
Des acteurs et des règles. Une analyse de la réforme du gouvernement suisse (1990-
2002), octobre 2002 
205  HUGENTOBLER Alfred 
Presseförderung in der Schweiz. Alternative zum heutigen Subventionierungsmodell, 
février 2003 
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206  FAVRE David  
Access pricing et régulation ferroviaires. La Suisse face aux expériences européennes, 
mars 2003 
207  GUALTIEROTTI Antoine F. 
Du bon usage de la statistique dans la conduite de l'Etat: Placent ad nauseam repetita?, 
mars 2003 
208  EFIONAYI-MÄDER Denise, CHIMIENTI Milena, CATTACIN Sandro  
Evaluation des Rahmenprogramms Schulen und Gesundheit - Evaluation du pro-
gramme-cadre Ecoles et santé, juillet 2003 
209  HÄUSERMANN Silija 
Internationalisation des politiques publiques et mise en œuvre fédéraliste – La libérali-
sation des marchés publics cantonaux en Suisse, juillet 2003 
210  STEMMLE Dieter, CATTACIN Sandro, unter Mitarbeit von LOSA Stefano 
und SCHLEITER Susanne  
Strategien nachhaltiger Bevölkerungsinformation. Eine Analyse der Stop-Aids-
Präventionskampagnen des Bundesamtes für Gesundheit unter besonderer Berücksich-
tigung des Social Marketing, juillet 2003 
211  SOGUEL Nils, IOGNA-PRAT Simon, MARTIN Marc-Jean 
Comparatif 2002 des finances cantonales et communales, septembre 2003 
212  HÄUSERMANN, Silja, Antonello SPAGNOLO 
Le rôle des énoncés évaluatifs dans la politique de lutte contre le chômage, 
avril 2004 
213  MARIETHOZ Marc, SAVARY Jérôme 
Des droits sur l'air? Une analyse de la gestion de l'air en Suisse sous l’angle 
de l’approche des régimes institutionnels de ressources naturelles, août 
2004 
214  BATORI Frédéric 
EVM et l’institutionnalisation du partenariat entre l’école et les parents: 
quelles conséquences sur l’orientation des élèves? août 2004 
215  GERBER Jean-David 
La nouvelle gouvernance comme moyen d’arbitrage entre les intérêts de 
développement et de protection du paysage. Le cas du parc naturel régio-
nal de Chartreuse, août 2004 
216  HONEGGER Edith 
Die Gemischten Ausschüsse in den Sektoriellen Abkommen zwischen der 
Schweiz und der EG, août 2004 
217  SOGUEL Nils, IOGNA-PRAT Simon, BEUTLER Toni 
Comparatif 2003 des finances cantonales et communales, septembre 2004 
218  annulé 
219  AUBIN David, NAHRATH Stéphane, VARONE Frédéric 
Paysage et propriété: patrimonialisation, communautarisation ou pluri-
domanialisation, octobre 2004 
220  SCHWARZMANN Ueli 
Spitex: Ein taugliches Instrument in der Gesundheitspolitik?, novembre 
2004 
221  KELLENBERGER Stephan 
Les instruments volontaires dans la politique climatique et énergétique 
suisse: motif de leur introduction et chances de leur application, mars 2005 
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222  SOGUEL Nils, IOGNA-PRAT Simon 
Audit externe sur la dette globale du Canton du Valais, jjuillet 2005 
223  FREIBURGHAUS Dieter, BUCHLI Felix, HONEGGER Edith 
Das Duopol der legitimen Gewalt im schweizerischen Bundesstaat. Zwei 
Fallstudien zu Armee und Polizei, juin 2005 
224  OLGIATI Mirta 
Politique de la mémoire nationale: la sélection du patrimoine documentaire 
en suisse, août 2005 
225  SOGUEL Nils, BEUTLER, Toni, IOGNA-PRAT Simon  
Comparatif 2004 des finances cantonales et communales, septembre 2005 
226  KNOEPFEL Peter, NAHRATH Stéphane 
The sustainable management of natural resources: from traditional envi-
ronmental protection policies towards institutional natural resource regi-
mes (INRR), décembre 2005 
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L’IDHEAP EN BREF 
 
Avec l’Institut de hautes études en administration publique, la Suisse 
dispose d’une haute école pour l’enseignement et la recherche dans le 
domaine de l’administration des affaires publiques. 
Créée en 1981, l’IDHEAP est une fondation autonome associée à 
l’Université et à l’Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne. 
L’IDHEAP a pour vocation la formation postgrade des étudiants qui 
désirent se consacrer à la fonction publique ou parapublique, le perfec-
tionnement professionnel des fonctionnaires des administrations au 
sens large. Il a également une mission de recherche et d’expertise dans 
tous les domaines du secteur public. 
Institut universitaire, l’IDHEAP propose une palette de formations 
adaptée à l’enseignement et au perfectionnement des connaissances des 
spécialistes de la fonction publique. Il dispense notamment le Master of 
Public Administration (MPA) et organise des séminaires pour spécialis-
tes et cadres (SSC). L’Institut assure une formation doctorale et décerne 
le titre de docteur en science administrative de l’Université de Lau-
sanne. Centre de formation au service des collectivités publiques, 
l’IDHEAP est ouvert aux entreprises, permettant à leurs collaborateurs 
de s’initier aux modes de fonctionnement propres au secteur public. 
Comme tout institut universitaire, l’IDHEAP poursuit également une 
mission de recherche. 
Son objectif est de fournir les instruments d’analyse et de gestion néces-
saires à la réflexion des responsables du secteur public. 
Concentration unique en Suisse de spécialistes de l’analyse des politi-
ques et du management publics, l’IDHEAP intervient à la demande des 
entreprises et collectivités communales, cantonales, fédérales, voire 
étrangères, pour résoudre des problématiques spécifiques. Les mandats 
de conseil contribuent à nourrir l’interactivité permanente entre théorie 
et pratique qui caractérise les formations dispensées par l’IDHEAP. 
